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I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1979 and 2000, every state enacted provisions that eased transfer
ofjuveniles to adult court.' Numerous states increased the types of crimes that
trigger transfer and most also lowered the age at which it could occur; thus, for
instance, a majority of states passed laws permitting waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction for ten-year-olds charged with murder, and many other states
created a presumption of transfer for juveniles older than twelve or thirteen who
committed a serious or second felony.2 A third of the states also enacted
statutes authorizing prosecutorial waiver or "direct file," while the number of
jurisdictions that adopted "automatic" transfer regimes for designated crimes
(rather than leaving that decision to the discretion of the juvenile court or the
prosecutor) more than doubled to thirty-one. Perhaps even more significant
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. The author thanks
participants at the Texas Tech University School of Law Symposium on Juveniles and the Criminal Law, held
April 5, 2013, at Texas Tech University School of Law, for comments on the ideas expressed in this Article.
1. Gail B. Goodman, ArrestedDevelopment: An Alternative to Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole
in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059, 1071-72 (2007).
2. ELIZABETH S. ScorT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 97 (2008).
3. Richard E. Redding & Barbara Mrozoski, Adjudicatory and Dispositional Decision Making in
Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 232,237 (Kirk
Heilbrun et al. eds., 2005); see also PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER
PROVISIONS 2 (1998), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172836.pdf.
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than these changes to transfer jurisdiction, thirteen states lowered the age at
which juvenile court jurisdiction ends from eighteen to either fifteen or
sixteen.4 In New York State alone, this move led to the adult prosecution of
over 45,000 youths aged sixteen and seventeen in 201 0.
As a result of this legislative flurry, transfers of juveniles to adult court
shot up at least 70%,6 and the number ofjuveniles under eighteen prosecuted as
adults skyrocketed from somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 a year to
250,000 a year. While in the past several years some states have reduced the
scope of transfer or have raised the age for criminal court jurisdiction, the latter
number has stayed fairly constant since 2000.9 Furthermore, even those
juveniles who remain in juvenile court can be subjected to "blended"
sentencing, a dispositional type of transfer system that permits imposition of
adult sentences on individuals convicted in juvenile court, either immediately
after their conviction or when they reach eighteen.' 0
Borrowing heavily from a book I co-authored with Mark Fondacaro,
Juveniles at Risk: A Plea for Preventive Justice, this Article argues that transfer
should be abolished and that juvenile court jurisdiction should be expanded, not
reduced." Treating juvenile offenders like adult offenders wastes resources,
damages juveniles, and decreases public safety." Offenders under the age of
4. Redding & Mrozoski, supra note 3, at 238.
5. Mosi Secret, New York Judge Seeks New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/nyregion/new-yorks-chief-judge-seeks-new-system-for-juvenile-
defendants.html.
6. Richard E. Redding, Adult Punishment for Juvenile Offenders: Does It Reduce Crime?, in
HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 375, 377 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin
Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006).
7. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 8 1,
97 (2000). The pre-1979 estimate ofjuveniles tried as adults is based on the number ofjuveniles typically
subject to judicial waiver-the primary or only means of authorizing adjudication ofjuveniles in adult court
prior to 1979--over the past decade. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 10 (estimating that judicial waiver
hit a "historic peak" in 1994, with 13,100 juveniles transferred in that year).
8. Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and (Past and) Future ofJuvenile Crime Regulation, 31 LAW
& INEQ. 535, 548-50 (2013) (reporting that Washington repealed its automatic transfer statute in 2009, that
Connecticut raised the age of criminal court jurisdiction from sixteen to eighteen in 2007, and that Illinois
repealed a provision mandating adult prosecution for fifteen-year-olds charged with selling drugs near a school
or housing project in 2005).
9. See id. at 538-40. As late as 2007, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
estimated that approximately 247,000 people under eighteen were referred to criminal court in that year.
GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 21. Most of these individuals do not go to adult prisons initially. Id. at 25.
For instance, in 2009, state prisons housed only 2,778 offenders under the age of eighteen. Id. In contrast, in
many states, persons who commit a crime prior to turning eighteen are transferred from ajuvenile correctional
facility to an adult facility at age eighteen. See infra note 10.
10. See Jennifer Albaugh & Haley Wamstad, Striking a Fair Balance: Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction in
North Dakota, 88 N.D. L. REV. 139, 152-57 (2012) (describing five types of blended sentencing regimes,
four of which permit a juvenile court to send a juvenile to adult prison either initially or once the juvenile
reaches eighteen if an extended sentence is determined to be warranted; at least twenty-four states have such
provisions).
I1. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE
JUSTICE (2011).
12. See id at 77-80.
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eighteen should never be tried in adult court or subjected to adult sentences.
Nor should people who are convicted as juveniles be detained for their crimes
past the age of twenty-five, except in extremely limited circumstances.
The most obvious objection to this admittedly radical proposal is that it is
politically infeasible.13 Moral panics, driven by media and politicians, have
created a lucrative market for punitive policies, regardless of the crime rate.14
Prosecutorial demand for more plea bargaining power, unhindered by lobbying
groups that represent offenders, also increases demand for expansive transfer
power.15 Independent of political machinations, many legislatures and courts
would likely resist the abolition of transfer and the accompanying limitation on
dispositional jurisdiction on the ground that transfer and the sentences that go
with it are necessary devices for assuring accountability, at least for the most
serious crimes.' 6 Even the most passionate advocates for a separate juvenile
court likely believe that transfer must be maintained as a retributive safety
valve. 1
If juvenile justice is reconceptualized as a preventive mechanism rather
than a punishment regime, however, transfer becomes much less alluring.' 8 If
the primary goal ofjuvenile justice is public safety, with retribution conceived
as an important goal only to the extent that recognizing it is necessary to ensure
systemic legitimacy, then maintaining an adult court option for juveniles
becomes unnecessary and counterproductive. 9 As a political matter, a system
that offers reduced recidivism is likely to be an attractive alternative to the long-
term incarceration in adult prisons that is currently the fate of many juvenile
offenders, especially if the system can also promise fiscal savings and effective
treatment.2 0 Together, crime reduction, taxpayer relief, and reformation (rather
than exile) of juvenile offenders could well outweigh the desire to satisfy
punitive retributive urges and any negative consequences that flow from
ignoring them.2 1
13. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics ofthe Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510
(2002).
14. Elizabeth S. Scott& Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 807 (2003) (stating
that the trend toward punitive juvenile justice reforms in the 1980s and 1990s "has features of what
sociologists describe as a moral panic, in which the media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other in
an escalating pattem of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat").
15. See Stuntz, supra note 13, at 510 ("[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit
cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and
growing marginalization ofjudges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader
ones.").
16. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 207,210-11 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (discussing transfer in the context of the limitation ofjuvenile courts).
17. See, e.g., id. at 208 ("It is the limited capacity of the juvenile court to punish that leads to transfers as
a universal exception to juvenile court jurisdiction in the United States.").
18. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 76-77.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 63-64.
21. See id at 127.
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Ironically, a major obstacle to this agenda is the diminished culpability
rationale that progressive reformers have advanced as a way of mitigating
today's punitive policies.22 Based on common sense, developmental science,
and neurobiological discoveries, the diminished culpability argument is that
juveniles deserve more lenient sentences because they are psychosocially less
mature and characterologically less developed than adults.23 This concept has
been remarkably successful at helping end the juvenile death penalty and
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.2 4
Unfortunately, however, the diminished culpability rationale is not likely
to have a major impact on the much more prevalent practice of transferring mid
and older adolescents to adult court, nor on the related legislative maneuver of
expanding adult court jurisdiction. In fact, would-be reformers' conceptuali-
zation of juvenile offenders as less culpable versions of adults probably plays
into the hands of those who want to maintain transfer and other policies that
treat juveniles like adults. The diminished culpability rationale facilitates
discounted sentences, but it also justifies carrying out those sentences in adult
court, where culpability is king. Moreover, because the scientific evidence
indicates that, from mid-adolescence onward, juveniles are not significantly
different from adults in terms of the traditional culpability doctrine, the
diminished culpability rationale does not require or justify sentences that are
significantly shorter than adult sentences.2 5 In light of the inordinate length of
today's adult dispositional practices, juvenile dispositions can justifiably still be
quite long even if the diminished culpability model ultimately wins the day.
In Juveniles at Risk, we contended that the best rationale for treating
juveniles differently than adults is not their lesser culpability, but their lesser
deterrability or, more precisely, the fact that criminal sanctions do not have the
same deterrent effect on juveniles as they do on adults. 2 6  The lesser
deterrability rationale has long sanctioned separate justice systems for people
with mental disabilities on the theory that the prospect of criminal punishment
is less likely to inhibit crimes by these types of individuals and that an
27
alternative, prevention-oriented commitment regime is, therefore, necessary.
The same rationale can easily justify a juvenile justice system, because
juveniles as a group are demonstrably less risk-averse and more impulsive than
adults.28 In contrast to the lesser culpability rationale, which is focused on
22. Scort & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 124-26.
23. Id at 118-48. Scott and Steinberg provide the single best exposition of this position, but they have
many intellectual forbears. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
26. SLOBOCN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 44-48.
27. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally 111, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1190, 1233 (1974) (The mental condition of the "criminally insane .... excludes them from the operation of
the traditional punishment-deterrence system, because they are both unable to make autonomous decisions
about their antisocial behavior and unaffected by the prospect of punishment.").
28. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
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punishing juveniles (albeit less harshly than adults), the lesser deterrability
rationale is focused on preventing juveniles from reoffending. In terms of the
purposes of punishment, a prevention-oriented juvenile justice system aims not
at retribution or general deterrence, but at specific deterrence and rehabilitation.
Incapacitation as incarceration also plays a role, but only as a last resort.
Because these purposes of a prevention-oriented approach to juvenile
justice are so different from the primary purpose of the adult criminal justice
system, they provide a much more solid conceptual and pragmatic justification
for a separate juvenile justice system. More to the point of this Article, a
prevention-oriented approach provides a strong basis for abolishing
transfer and transfer-like policies. While desert-based punishment-even
discounted punishment-requires adult-style sentences for the more serious
crimes, prevention can be accomplished within the juvenile system, even for the
most dangerous juvenile offenders. No link between adult criminal justice and
juvenile justice is necessary.
Part I of this Article summarizes why, compared to the diminished
culpability notion, a prevention-oriented system of juvenile justice is a much
better fit with what we know about the causes of juvenile crime and how to
reduce it.29 Part III then explains why, if prevention is the goal of juvenile
justice, transfer makes little sense.30 Transfer is a poor general and specific
deterrent, and is much more likely to do harm than good to both juvenile
offenders and society at large. The only plausible reason to maintain transfer is
to assure that offenders receive the punishment society thinks they deserve. But
from a utilitarian, prevention perspective, transfer is probably not necessary,
even as a means of assuaging retributive urges. Finally, Part IV of this Article
explains how a preventive juvenile justice system that eschews transfer would
work.3 1 The main innovation of such a system is that dispositional jurisdiction
would end at age twenty-five, regardless of the crime. Part IV of the Article
also proffers one possible exception to this latter limitation-young offenders
who are "dangerous beyond their control."32
II. CONCEPTUALIZING JUVENILE JUSTICE
In Juveniles at Risk, we described four models of juvenile justice.3 3 The
"rehabilitation" path, which probably comes closest to the original motivation
for establishing a separate court for juveniles, treats youths in trouble as
innocent and salvageable beings who must be kept away from adult criminals to
enhance their chances of becoming productive citizens.34 On this view, the
29. See infra Part ll.
30. See infra Part M.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
33. SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 6-7.
34. See id. at 6.
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triggering act need not be criminal, disposition is designed to make the child a
better person, and confinement meant as punishment is to be avoided. 35 The
second model-which we called the "adult retribution" model-heads in the
opposite direction. In vogue among many state legislatures since the late
1970s, it assumes that many young people who commit crimes are fully
accountable individuals who should usually be punished in the same fashion as
adults.37 This path leads to broad transfer-to-adult-court jurisdiction, adult-like
sentences in juvenile court, or both. The third option, which probably
represents the consensus academic view as well as the practice in a number of
jurisdictions, sits somewhere between the rehabilitative and adult retribution
approaches. It treats juveniles as neither innocent nor fully culpable, but
rather, posits that their responsibility is diminished because of their youth.4 0
"Under this 'diminished retribution' [or 'diminished culpability'] model,
dispositions are discounted proportionate to the juvenile's degree of
immaturity, either on an individual basis or categorically."4'
The fourth model, which is the one endorsed in Juveniles at Risk, we call
"individual prevention."42
Framed in terms of the traditional purposes of the criminal justice system, the
focus of the individual prevention model is specific deterrence through
treatment and, if necessary, incapacitation. Because of its focus on treatment,
the individual prevention path is closely related to the rehabilitation vision.
Unlike the rehabilitative model, however, this path avoids claiming that
juveniles are excused because of their youth, retains the retributive models'
threshold requirement of a criminal act, and is narrowly focused on policies
and procedures that promote recidivism-reduction rather than the broader
goal of creating a well-socialized individual. The individual prevention
model's primary divergence from the two retributive models is its rejection of
relative culpability as the basis for the duration and type of disposition.
Instead of that metric, the prevention model favors assessments of risk that
vary the intervention depending on the most effective, least restrictive means
of curbing future crime.43
In Juveniles at Risk, we devoted considerable space to explaining why the
individual prevention model is superior to the other three models." Instead of
35. See id. at 6-9.
36. See id at 6.
37. See id
38. See id. at 9-10.




43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id at 37-61.
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restating all of those arguments here, this Article will focus on a comparison
between the individual prevention model and the diminished retribution model.
A. The Diminished Culpability Rationale
The diminished culpability model had its genesis as far back as 1980 with
the promulgation of the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice
Standards.4 5 A number of scholars, including Frank Zimring, 46 Barry Feld,47
Elizabeth Scott, and Laurence Steinberg,48 have endorsed a version of this
model. Bolstered by developmental and neurobiological research over the past
two decades, they have made the intuitively appealing argument that juveniles
are less mature in legally relevant ways, including their relatively diminished
capacity to deliberate, consider consequences, and resist peer pressure.4 9
This body of work has had considerable, and deserved, success at re-
orienting the debate about juvenile justice, not just in academia, but in courts
and legislatures as well. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court partially
relied on the diminished retribution concept and Scott and Steinberg's work in
holding that, under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, juveniles are exempt from the death penalty.50 The Court relied on
similar reasoning in Graham v. Florida, which found unconstitutional life
without parole sentences for juveniles who commit non-homicide crimes,51 and
45. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND SANCTIONS 28, 34-35 (1980) [hereinafter ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS], available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/JJStandards
_JuvenileDelinquencyandSanctions.authcheckdam.pdf (rejecting rehabilitation and incapacitation, and
adopting "culpability" as the basis of sentencing in juvenile court).
46. See Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity,
Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 271,279-82 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (discussing possible ways
in which juveniles are less responsible than adults); see generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING
LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982) (arguing that because children think differently than adults, they
should be treated differently than adults).
47. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle ofOffense: Punishment, Treatment, and
the Diference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 912 (1988) (arguing for a "youth discount" based on
diminished responsibility).
48. See SCOT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 122 ("[W]e conclude
that ajustice regime grounded in mitigation corresponds to the developmental reality of adolescence and thus
is compatible with the law's commitment to allocating punishment fairly on the basis of blameworthiness.").
49. By linking these commentaries together, I do not mean to suggest that they all agree about the
precise contours of the diminished retribution model. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Two Views of the
Project, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1934, 1938 (1978) (reviewing the Juvenile Justice Standards Project and
criticizing the ABA's Standards punishment scheme noting, inter alia, that "the principles that lie behind the
pattern of proportional limits are difficult to discern").
50. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-73 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott's
earlier work on the relationship between developmental research and criminal culpability). The Court stated,
"[o]nce the diminished culpability ofjuveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for
the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults." Id. at 551.
51. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (holding that juveniles who commit homicide
should not be subject to the second most severe penalty because "[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express
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in Miller v. Alabama, which struck down mandatory life without parole
sentences for any crime committed by ajuvenile.52 The diminished culpability
rationale may also help explain some of the recent legislative activity that has
led to the reduction of transfer jurisdiction.5 3
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, however, the diminished culpability
model has at least three serious drawbacks. First, in describing the lesser
culpability ofjuveniles, the model stretches the implications of developmental
research beyond what it will bear. Juveniles are less culpable than adults, but
they are not as impaired in their judgment as advocates of the diminished
retributive model seem to think.54 Second, the diminished retribution model
prevents the juvenile justice system from making optimal use of the many
treatment innovations that have developed over the past two decades. The best
way to reduce juvenile recidivism is through community-based programs that
are an awkward fit in a system based on retributive punishment." Third, the
model's focus on culpability-the same metric that informs adult criminal
justice-undermines the argument for a separate juvenile justice system and,
most relevant to this Article, facilitates maintenance of a wide-ranging, but
counterproductive transfer mechanism.5 6
The relative culpability of juveniles can be viewed from both a legal and
empirical perspective. From the legal perspective, the Supreme Court's
juvenile sentencing cases clearly hold that juveniles do not deserve the ultimate
penalties available for adults-capital punishment and mandatory life without
parole. But the key question now is whether, as a matter of legal doctrine, the
diminished capacity rationale will have any significant impact on other types of
penalties. Chief Justice Roberts predicted in Miller that even life with parole
and lesser sentences are now on the chopping block in the juvenile offender
context.58  Perhaps so. But the majority opinion in Miller focused on the
inability of mandatory penalties to reflect individualized desert determinations,
not on the absolute length of the sentence. 5 9 After recounting how juveniles
the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for
retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult" (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
52. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S.
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason ofAdolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
53. See Scott, supra note 8, at 552-53 (asserting that recent retrenchment on punitive policy is due to a
growing tendency among lawmakers and the public to accept that young offenders are different from adults,
although also acknowledging that lower juvenile crime rates, the costs of punitive juvenile justice, and the
effectiveness of community-based treatments in reducing recidivism have also played a significant role).
54. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
57. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
58. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The principle behind today's decision seems to be only that
because juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently.... Unless confined, the only
stopping point for the Court's analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults.").
59. Id. at 2466 (majority opinion).
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are different from adults in terms of culpability, deterrability, characterological
stability, and reformability, Justice Kagan emphasized that it is "the mandatory
penalty schemes at issue here" that "prevent the sentencer from taking account
of these central considerations."o She also relied heavily on Graham's
equation of life without parole sentences and the death penalty, noting, as had
Graham, that both types of sentences are "irrevocable."6 1
Based on these pronouncements, one could easily conclude that, even if
the Court became more activist in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence (which
many Court observers believe is extremely unlikely6 2), it will focus on
dispositional rigidity rather than on sentence duration in determining whether a
disposition is cruel and unusual. Thus, for instance, the Court is more likely to
strike down statutes that impose a mandatory twenty-year sentence on every
adolescent armed robber over thirteen than to reject a thirty-year sentence
imposed on a fourteen-year-old armed robber after due consideration of blame-
worthiness, treatability, and other factors. If that is the case, then as a legal
matter, the diminished culpability rationale is not likely to require deep
discounts in maximum sentences for juveniles. Worthwhile noting in this
regard is that Simmons, Graham, Miller and Jackson, the litigants in the
Supreme Court's four juvenile cases, were, or are likely to be, resentenced to
multiple-decade prison terms despite their Eighth Amendment victories,63 and
that several states have vowed to continue to impose very hefty sentences on
juveniles, despite the Court's decisions.64
60. Id.
61. Id
62. John Stinneford, The Illusory Eighth Amendment 2 (forthcoming 2013). As Professor Stinneford
has noted about Eighth Amendment analysis, "outside [of the juvenile sentencing cases] the Court has
effectively abandoned judicial review of legislatively authorized punishments." Id
63. State of Missouri v. Christopher Simmons, MO. DEATH ROW (Dec. 11, 2008), http://missouri
deathrow.com/2008/12/state-of-missouri-v-christopher-simmons/. Simmons was resentenced to life without
parole. Id Graham was resentenced to twenty-five years. Jeff Kunerth, Life Without Parole Becomes 25
Years for Terence Graham, Subject of U.S. Supreme Court Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 24, 2012),
available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/ 2012-02-24/features/os-life-without-parole-terrance-graham-
20120224-12_1 terrance-graham-resentencing-parolel2. Jackson and Miller have not been resentenced, but
could be sentenced to forty years or life. See Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 (2013).
64. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, sitting in the state with the most juveniles serving life without
parole, has indicated that the appropriate sentence for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder is either life
with parole or life without parole, to be determined after a hearing examining the individualized factors
identified in Miller. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 297 (Pa. 2013). Nebraska passed a law
requiring a forty-year minimum sentence for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. Associated Press,
Lawmakers Advance Juvenile Sentencing Bill, WOWTNEWS (Apr. 11, 2013,11:58 AM), httpJ/www.wowt.
com/home/headlines/lawmakers-Advance-Juvenile-Sentencing-Bill20254 6961.html; Lloyd Dunkelberger,
Juvenile Sentencing Bill Passes Senate Criminal Justice Committee, TALLAHASSEE LEDGER (Apr. 8, 2013,
11:58 AM), http://www.theledger.com/article/20130408/politics/ 304085037 (containing a report ofajuvenile
sentencing bill in Florida that would impose a fifty-year minimum for murders and a fifty-year maximum for
non-murders); Billy Gun, Court Ruling Prompts State to Review Juvenile Sentencing Laws, THE ADVOCATE
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://theadvocate.com/news/5543798-123/court-ruling-prompts-state-to (describing a
Louisiana bill that would require juvenile offenders sentenced to life to serve a mmimum of fifty years before
parole eligibility). The governor of Iowa announced after Miller that all offenders serving life without parole
who committed their crimes while juveniles will now be eligible for parole in sixty years. Natalie Williams,
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Even if the courts were to take a more explicitly empirical perspective,
they are unlikely to conclude that deep mitigation is justified on the basis of
youth. Research measuring youthful capacities indicates that mid and late
adolescents, the juveniles who commit the bulk of the offending, possess a
fairly high degree of cognitive maturity.6 Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth
Cauffinan, the preeminent researchers in this area, state that under most
circumstances the "vast majority of individuals below the age of thirteen lack
certain intellectual and psychosocial capabilities that need to be present in order
to hold someone fully accountable for his or her actions."6 6 But their research
also indicates that, while fourteen through sixteen-year-olds are more
impulsive, less risk-averse, more prone to peer influence, and less formed
characterologically than adults, their judgments regarding antisocial conduct are
not significantly different (in absolute terms) from those of young adults.67
Furthermore, Steinberg and Cauffman found that seventeen-year-olds generally
"possess the intellectual and psychosocial capacities that permit the exercise of
good judgment, even under difficult circumstances."
These findings have significant and discouraging implications for efforts
to mitigate punitive juvenile justice policies. The commentary to the American
Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards, which adopts the diminished
responsibility approach, suggests that a juvenile who commits a crime that
would warrant a twenty-year sentence if committed by an adult should receive a
sentence of only three years. If empirical information is any guide, that is
wishful thinking from a desert perspective. Nothing in the developmental
literature comes close to suggesting that a sixteen-year-old who commits a
serious felony is only one-sixth as culpable as a twenty-one-year-old adult who
commits the same crime. Even Barry Feld, another advocate of the diminished
culpability model, has suggested only a 40% to 50% discount for a sixteen-
Juvenile Life Sentence Without Parole Debate, IOWA STATE DAILY.COM (Apr. 9, 2013, 4:15 PM),
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/ article_d566e930-9bd4-l1 e2-a63 1-001a4bcf887a.html. In Delaware,
Miller offenders are now to receive sentences of twenty-five years to life. S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del.
2013), available at http://legis.delaware.gov/lis/lisl47.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+9?Opendocument. In
Massachusetts, a "reform" law makes juveniles convicted of second-degree murder eligible for parole after
fifteen years. An Act to Reform the Juvenile Justice System (H52), PROGRESSIVE MASS., http://www.
progressivemass.com/an-act-to-reform-the-juvenile-justice-system-page/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
65. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspecive on Jurisdictional
Boundary, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFERS OF ADOLESCENTS TO ADULT
COURT, supra note 16, at 379, 395 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
66. Id at 398. They also suggest, however, that even pre-teens might have full capacity for
accountability when the consequences of their actions are clear and peer pressure is not involved. Id
67. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity ofJudgment in Adolescence: Why
Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SC. & L. 741, 752, 756 (2000) (including a table
showing the composite measure of capacity to make good (non-antisocial) decisions, on a one to five scale, to
be 2.86 for eighth graders, 2.77 for tenth graders, 2.94 for twelfth graders, and 3.1 for young adults). The
composite differences between adolescents and adults were highly statistically significant (at the 0.001 level)
but nonetheless remain small in absolute terms (less than 0.35 on a five-point scale), especially given the size
of the sample (1015 individuals). Id.
68. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 65, at 398-99.
69. ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 39-40.
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year-old offender, and presumably a smaller one still for a seventeen-year-old.70
Furthermore, his discounts appear to be based not on empirical assessments, but
rather, on simply dividing the period between thirteen and eighteen into thirds,
with fourteen-year-olds receiving between a 66% to 75% discount, sixteen-
year-olds receiving a 40% to 50% discount and eighteen-year-olds treated like
adults.7 1 Feld comes closer to describing the import of developmental research
when he states that, "[w]hile younger offenders may be less criminally
responsible than more mature violators, they do not differ as inherently or
fundamentally as the legal dichotomy between juvenile and criminal courts
suggest." 72
A second set of empirical findings that is hard to reconcile with the
diminished responsibility rationale has to do with the best methods of reducing
recidivism. Research has repeatedly shown that non-coercive sanctions are
better than prisons at reducing juvenile recidivism. 73 Multi-Systemic Therapy
(MST) and other community-based programs outperform treatment programs
that take place in detention facilities because they attack key risk factors-such
as family and peer dynamics, substance abuse, and poor school performance-
in the systems in which they occur, and because they avoid the criminological
effects of incarceration.74 But, because an effective MST regimen usually takes
only about four months, it would be inappropriately lenient for virtually any
felony if the primary focus of a juvenile disposition were punishment
proportionate to desert.75  And if a juvenile is transferred to adult court,
programs like MST are probably out of the question, even if they existed in the
adult setting, given the transferring authority's finding that these juveniles have
committed more serious crimes.
These observations lead to the third problem with the diminished
responsibility rationale. Ifjuvenile dispositions are to be measured in terms of
the same metric employed in adult court-culpability-why maintain a separate
juvenile system? As Barry Feld has argued, the diminished responsibility of
70. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing
Policy, 88 J. CRI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 118 (1997).
71. Id Note that if discounts were to be determined solely on empirical information, sixteen-year-olds
would "deserve" more of a discount than fourteen-year-olds, since they are (slightly) more likely to lack
capacity to avoid antisocial decisions. See supra note 67 (recounting composite measures of capacity to make
good decisions).
72. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems'Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME &
JUST. 189, 245 (1998).
73. Mark W. Lipsey, The Primary Factors that Characterize Effective Interventions with Juvenile
Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Overview, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 124, 143 (2009) ("[I]nterventions that
embodied 'therapeutic' philosophies" are "more effective than those based on strategies of control or
coercion-surveillance, deterrence, and discipline.").
74. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 31-35 (describing Functional Family Therapy,
Multisystemic Therapy, Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, and the Fast Track Program).
75. Id at 137. A number of effective programs that take place within facilities are also relatively short-
term (ranging up to ten weeks). See Sean C. McGarvey, Juvenile Justice and Mental Health: Innovation in
the Laboratory ofHuman Behavior, 3 JURIMETRICS J. 97, 108-09 (2012) (describing three cognitive behavior
therapy programs).
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juveniles can be accommodated through sentencing discounts. In other
words, a diminished capacity rationale for juvenile punishment can lead to the
conclusion that all juveniles should be tried in adult court, a result that very few
juvenile advocates desire (and one that even Feld has repudiated in later
writing).n
Advocates of the diminished culpability model may object that I have
unfairly characterized their position. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg,
for instance, have clearly argued that reduction of recidivism ought to be an
objective ofjuvenile justice, and have posited that programs like MST ought to
be part of every juvenile justice system.78  Thus, they state that "the case for a
separate mitigation-based justice system for the adjudication and disposition of
juveniles rests not only on proportionality, but also on evidence that such a
system is the best means to minimize the social cost of youth crime."79 In other
words, Scott and Steinberg are willing to contemplate a hybrid regime that
endorses both retributive and preventive goals. 80
For them, however, retributive goals are still paramount. For instance,
Scott and Steinberg state that punishment calibration should be based on the
"seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the offender. ,8 ' In a later
work, Scott and Steinberg repeat that, "under the developmental model,
dispositions may vary somewhat on the basis of preventive factors, but the
range should be limited to avoid unfairness"; thus, "[w]ithin a limited range,
youths who commit similar crimes will receive sanctions of similar duration,
and none will be subject to dispositions that exceed what is fairly deserved on
the basis of the youth's culpability and the seriousness of the offense."82 For
Scott and Steinberg, a juvenile who commits a serious crime should receive a
serious sentence, even if such a disposition might increase the risk of
recidivism. Most relevant to the subject of this Article, juveniles who commit
76. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation ofthe Juvenile Court-Part IL Race and the "Crack Down" on
Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REv. 327, 389 (1999) ("A graduated age-culpability sentencing scheme in an
integrated criminal justice system avoids the inconsistencies associated with the binary either-juvenile-or-adult
drama currently played out in judicial waiver proceedings and in prosecutorial charging decisions and
introduces proportionality to the sentences imposed on the many youths currently tried as adults.").
77. Barry C. Feld, A Century ofJuvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution That Failed?, 34
N. KY. L. REv. 189, 255-56 (2007) ("[T]he primary virtue ofjuvenile courts is simply that they are not the
criminal justice system. Regardless of their ability to help or rehabilitate juveniles, they do less harm than
when states process children in the adult criminal justice system." (footnote omitted)).
78. SCOrT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 211-20 (describing
"promising research on programs" like MST and stating "it makes sense to include research-based programs
as a key component of the legal response to juvenile crime").
79. Id. at 144-48.
80. Id.
81. Id at 231.
82. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation,
71 LA. L. REv. 35, 87-93 (2010).
83. SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 95 ("[A]n important element
of fairness is that similar cases be treated similarly; thus, we are not sanguine about a regime in which one
armed robber is sent to a correctional institution (the deserved punishment), while another receives a
community sanction based on judicial judgments about their relative risk and potential for rehabilitation.").
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the most serious crimes would have to be sent to adult court, because only
adult-length imprisonment metes out the punishment these juveniles deserve.8
For crimes at the other end of the spectrum, in contrast, a desert-based
approach of the type Scott and Steinberg advocate dictates leniency or no
punishment at all. That result is unfortunate from a crime-control perspective.
In particular, the group ofjuveniles who have come to be known as "life-course
persistent offenders[ ]"-juveniles who begin committing offenses, usually
minor ones, before adolescence-may require serious intervention if the goal is
to forestall further offenses.
Finally, for crimes in the middle-the vast majority of juvenile
misbehavior-the impact of the diminished culpability model is ambiguous. If,
for instance, the crime is drug distribution or burglary-crimes that might result
in a several-year sentence in adult court-is a non-prison sentence permitted?86
Perhaps, one might argue, a prolonged community-based disposition can have
as much "punitive bite" as a shorter prison term. But research asking people
about their retributive instincts indicates that once the "deserved" term extends
beyond two years or so, no type of intermediate sanction is perceived to be of
equivalent harshness as imprisonment.87 So, again, the diminished culpability
model is in some tension with the types of non-incarcerative treatment
programs Scott and Steinberg say they favor. In short, dispositions based on
proportionate desert must be abandoned if prevention is going to be taken
seriously as a goal of juvenile justice.
B. The Individual Prevention Rationale
A juvenile justice system based on the goal of individual prevention is not
focused on desert and thus avoids the pitfalls of the diminished culpability
approach. At the same time, it encounters other problems familiar to anyone
who has perused the literature on theories of punishment. The individual
prevention model more easily accommodates empirical findings about the
differences between youth and adults and the best methods of reducing
recidivism. But it also raises concerns about abuses of discretion that can occur
84. Id at 243-44 (stating that youth who have previously been convicted of murder, attempted murder,
armed robbery, rape, aggravated assault, or kidnapping would be eligible for transfer if their current charge is
a violent felony).
85. See Terrie E. Moffitt, Life-Course-Persistent andAdolescence-LimitedAntisocial Behavior: A 10-
Year Research Review and a Research Agenda, in CAUSES OF CONDUCT DISORDER AND JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 49, 49 (Benjamin B. Lahey et al. eds., 2003) (stating that youth who routinely offend at an
early age are more likely to continue offending past majority).
86. Despite the fact that the vast majority of juveniles sentenced as adults are convicted of non-
homicides, the average sentence for transferred juveniles is still nine years. Kevin J. Strom & Steven K.
Smith, Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT
1-2 (Sept. 1998), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jfdcc.pdf.
87. Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of Intermediate Penal
Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approachfor Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 86 (1995).
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in connection with determining levels of risk. Those concerns in part explain
the continued attractiveness of the diminished culpability model, which sets
relatively determinate minimum and maximum time limits on disposition.
With a few tweaks, however, the individual prevention model can avoid its
most pressing defects and provide a superior theoretical basis for a separate
juvenile system.
The case for the individual prevention model is explicitly based on science
-in particular, the robust empirical conclusion that juveniles are much more
reckless than adults.88 That finding not only supports the conclusion that they
are less culpable than adults, but also verifies that they are less deterrable. The
Supreme Court itself has recognized this fact in cases such as Roper, Graham,
and Miller. As Justice Kennedy stated in both Roper and Graham, "the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . .. that
juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence."89 In Miller, Justice Kagan
repeated this conclusion, referring to youths' "transient rashness, proclivity for
risk, and inability to assess consequences" and "their immaturity, recklessness
and impetuosity" in explaining not only their "lessened. .. 'moral culpability,"'
but also noted their failure to "consider potential punishment."90
The fact that juveniles are less deterrable than adults provides the
justification for handling juvenile offenders in a system separate from the adult
criminal justice system, just as people with mental disability, considered
undeterrable because of their mental impairments, are subject to civil
commitment, rather than criminal punishment.91 Of course, the typical juvenile
offender is not as impaired as the typical person subject to civil commitment.
But the claim here is not that juveniles are excused for their behavior; it is that
they are not as responsive to the dictates of criminal law as are adults, and thus
can justifiably be subject to a separate system of justice. The Supreme Court
endorsed an analogous proposition in Kansas v. Hendricks, which upheld
preventive commitment of adult sex offenders who are not psychotic, but who
are less deterrable than the "ordinary recidivist." 92
For reasons already suggested, once prevention is accepted as the primary
goal of juvenile justice, community dispositions in lieu of incarceration are
easily justifiable if they are effective at reducing recidivism. Indeed, if
community dispositions are superior in this regard, a strong argument can be
88. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 20-23 (summarizing research).
89. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
90. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
91. See supra note 27.
92. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997) ("This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled
with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons
who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings."). The "ordinary
recidivist" distinction comes from Justice Scalia's opinion in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 420 (2002)
("Ordinary recidivists choose to reoffend and are therefore amenable to deterrence through the criminal law;
those subject to civil commitment under the [sexually violent predator law], because their mental illness is an
affliction and not a choice, are unlikely to be deterred.").
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made that the Constitution requires such dispositions on the ground that they
are the least drastic means of achieving the government's objective-
prevention.93 Moreover, any detention that does take place must be governed
by the same least-drastic-means principle, meaning that periodic review is
needed to ensure that the detained individual represents a high risk and to
guarantee that treatment is being provided to reduce that risk.9 4
The criticisms of the individual prevention model come in three varieties.
The first-that preventive dispositions are insufficient as a deterrent-is taken
up in the next section.95 The second is that a prevention-oriented regime is
"unfair," both because it can result in disparate sentences for the same offense
and because it might sanction people more or less than they deserve, thus
diluting their accountability and diminishing public support for the law. 9 6 The
third criticism is that, even if such a system can be considered fair in the
abstract, it is impossible to implement without significant abuse.
The latter two criticisms-which reflect a larger and centuries-old debate
between retributive and utilitarian punishment theorists-raise complicated
issues that cannot be satisfactorily covered in full here, so only a few points will
be highlighted. First, as we argued in Juveniles at Risk, a plausible case can be
made that a system that looks at an offender's history and character, as a
preventive regime does, is much more likely to achieve fair results-that is,
results that reflect an appropriate disposition of an individual's case-than one
that focuses solely on the accused's offense.98 James Whitman recently put this
point well when he stated that "there are as many kinds of justice as there are
offenders," a tenet he claims was understood and approved both by the pre-
modern common law judges who shaped the substantive criminal law and by
adherents of the "modern penalism" that informed the drafters of the first
edition of the Model Penal Code.99 It is likely that much of the public today
feels the same way. 00 If these observations have validity, a juvenile justice
93. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 80-83; see also Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan,
Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement ofSexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV.
319, 357 (2003) (arguing, based on Supreme Court case law and substantive due process doctrine, that the
State may not simply "warehouse" individuals who are subject to preventive detention, but must instead
provide meaningful treatment).
94. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364 (requiring periodic review and release if the individual is "safe to be at
large").
95. See infra Part ill.
96. See Scorr & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 89 ("Open ended
indeterminacy, whether based on risk assessment or diagnosis, is unsatisfactory because it poses a substantial
risk of unfairness that inevitably threatens the legitimacy of any regime aimed solely at prevention.").
97. Id (expressing concern about the imprecision of risk assessment).
98. SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 54 ("[T]he desert visited by a particular term of
imprisonment for, say, robbery may vary from robber to robber, depending on the conditions of imprisonment
and the nature of the robber.").
99. James Whitman, The Failure of Retributivism in the American Common Law 29, 39 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
100. Cf Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST.
1, 34 (2000) (concluding, based on responses to vignettes of various crimes, that while offense seriousness
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system that bases disposition solely on the actus reus and mens rea of the
offense will almost always result in injustice.
Even if we rely on blame for a specific offense as the metric of fairness,
however, the goal of justice-in the sense of consistent results-is unlikely to
be achieved. Accurate calibrations of blame, based on often indecipherable
mental phenomena at the time of the act, are usually difficult, and often
impossible.o'0 Prosecutorial charging discretion, jury decision-making
discretion, and judicial sentencing discretion make a mockery of the idea that
the same crime triggers the same time.10 2 In contrast, a preventive regime can,
as discussed further below, at least rely on concrete probability estimates and
evidence-based risk management techniques in trying to treat similar levels of
risk equally.10 3
The complaint that a preventive regime does not hold offenders
responsible for their conduct (or character) is also off-base. First, offenders in a
preventive regime would still be held accountable because they would be found
guilty and receive a sentence, which for very serious crimes would usually
involve, under classic risk management principles, a period of detention before
resorting to community-based programs.104 Just as importantly, in a system
properly focused on risk management, offenders are constantly reminded that
"explained the largest amount of variation in sentencing preferences .... when respondents were asked in a
separate question what was the purpose of the sentence they assigned, . . . . the goal of just deserts ranked
fourth behind special deterrence, boundary setting, and rehabilitation as a 'very important' reason for choosing
the sentence" (quoting Joseph E. Jacoby & Christopher S. Dunn, National Survey on Punishment for Criminal
Offenses: Executive Summary, Presented at the National Conference on Punishment for Criminal Offenses
(Nov. 9-10, 1987))).
101. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE AND
SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 42-48 (2007) (cataloguing the
difficulties in assessing past mental states).
102. Even in the death penalty context, where concern about reliability is at its height, vast disparities in
charging practices have been documented within the same state. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Death
Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REv. 17,36-37 (2009) (describing studies in Florida, Delaware, Missouri, and
Maryland). For a discussion on jury decision-making, see NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE:
JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAw 134, 166, 248 (1995) (reporting studies of laypeople showing significant
disagreement about the mens rea for homicide, the application of felony murder rules and the scope of the
self-defense doctrine). For a discussion on the persistence of judicial sentencing disparities even under
guidelines systems, see Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1683-84
(2012) ("[T]he guideline range-assumed by many to be identical for similar offenders convicted of similar
offenses-can be, and is, calculated very differently for any number of reasons, including happenstance, lack
of clarity in the guidelines, different interpretations of the guidelines, different views of the evidence, and
varying prosecutorial practices." (footnotes omitted)).
103. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note I1, at 68-76, 83-92 (discussing risk assessment and risk
management).
104. The analogue to civil commitment fits here as well: Typically, people who are subject to involuntary
commitment are hospitalized until they are stabilized and a community-based placement, granted on
conditional grounds, can be arranged. See Amy Allbright et al., Outpatient Civil Commitment Laws: An
Overview, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 179, 179-81 (2002) (summarizing state laws
authorizing outpatient commitment).
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they are responsible for their actions and that they have significant control over
the nature and duration of the State's control over them.105
Moving to the practical complaints against a preventive regime, the most
common are that the risk assessments and treatment programs necessary to
make a risk management system work are untrustworthy and that the resulting
uncertainty will lead to improper detentions, ineffective rehabilitation, and
perhaps even a regime allowing intervention before any serious crime is
committed. o0 In Juveniles at Risk, we dealt with these objections at length. 0 7
Only a few observations will be made here.
First, for legality and legitimacy reasons, no juvenile disposition should
take place in the absence of a conviction for a statutorily defined crime. That
crime might consist, however, of conduct that ordinarily would not lead to
conviction of an adult. For instance, torturing animals or bullying might be
sufficient grounds for intervention, given the association of these types of acts
with risk. 08  However, the aforementioned least-drastic-means principle
generally would prohibit any type of detention in this or any other situation
unless the government could prove a substantial probability that the detention
is necessary to prevent a serious crime (in Juveniles at Risk we suggested a 50%
threshold, as demonstrated by actuarial assessments' 09). Otherwise, interven-
tion would have to take place in the community. The latter principle answers
Scott and Steinberg's complaint that, in a preventive regime, a pre-adolescent
who is arrested for a minor crime but who has multiple risk factors "might be a
candidate for correctional interventions that extend for as long as he is under
juvenile court jurisdiction."' "o Although some sort of long-term intervention
for a life-course persistent offender might sometimes be necessary, multi-year
detention of individuals who commit only minor crimes could not occur in a
properly administered preventive regime.
Scott and Steinberg make the related claim that "risk assessment is far
from an exact science and will always rely on the subjective judgments of
justice system decision-makers," which, in turn, "may well result in greater
disparities in the treatment of white and minority youths.""' But risk
assessment is no longer the "subjective" enterprise imagined by Scott and
Steinberg. As we point out in Juveniles at Risk, professionals conducting
evaluations of risk today can rely on a number of actuarial and structured
105. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 58-59 (discussing how risk management regimes
enhance accountability).
106. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT (1999) (arguing that the rehabilitative premise of the juvenile justice system is fatally flawed and that
integrating the juvenile justice system with the adult system, constrained by sentencing guidelines, will reduce
the impact of bias).
107. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11.
108. Id. at 66.
109. Id. at 68-69.
110. Scort & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 90.
111. Id at90-91.
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professional judgment instruments to structure their inquiries." 2 Although we
agree that risk assessment is not an "exact science," these instruments reduce
the inevitable influence of bias because they set out clear decision-making
criteria and produce a concrete probability estimate that sets a baseline for the
ultimate conclusion of risk."'3 Modem risk evaluation may even be better at
bias reduction than desert-based schemes that rely on amorphous mental states
and inconsistent culpability rules; even with the advent of determinate
sentencing, racial and other disparities have proliferated,"l 4 and transfer
decisions, despite their explicit or implicit focus on "objective" offense
characteristics, have exacerbated that situation."'
A further curb on abuses of discretion in a preventive regime is that, as
already noted, interventions in such a regime-whether they take place in
detention or in the community-would be subject to continuous review." 6 In
short, mistakes are correctable in a system based on prevention."' 7 In a desert-
based regime, in contrast, once culpability is determined, it is immutable." 8
Finally, analogous to desert proportionality, risk proportionality would
require proof of increasingly greater risk in order to prolong the intervention.119
Based both on risk proportionality reasoning and concerns about abuse, we
proposed in Juveniles at Risk that even those who are considered high risk
should be released by the end ofjuvenile court jurisdiction.12 0 More concretely,
for reasons developed below, we proposed that the endpoint of dispositional
jurisdiction should normally be set at age twenty-five.121
As a major component of our proposal, Juveniles at Risk argued that, in a
preventive regime, transfer is neither legitimate nor necessary.122 Transfer
would not be legitimate because culpability would no longer be the basis for
disposition; thus, juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to long-term
sentences in adult prison simply on desert grounds.12 3 Transfer would not be
necessary because dangerous youth can be handled in the juvenile justice
112. SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note I1, at 74.
113. For a general treatment of these instruments and their accuracy, see Christopher Slobogin, Risk
Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 196 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin
R. Reitz eds., 2012).
114. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 102, at 1683 ("The new, harsher rules [under the federal
sentencing guidelines] had a disproportionate impact on black offenders, and some of these rules were not
necessary to satisfy the legitimate purposes of sentencing.").
115. DAVID L. MYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS ADULTS 127
(2005) ("Older, male, nonwhite, and poor juveniles from urban areas continue to represent the majority of
waived adolescents.").
116. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997).
117. SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 63--64.
118. See id.
119. Id.at68-69.
120. Id. at 65-66.
121. See infra Part IV.
122. SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 79-80.
123. Id.
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system; adult dispositions are not needed to protect the public.12 4 The added
advantage of this position is that it would eradicate an institution that does
affirmative harm to juveniles but does little to enhance public safety. Before
describing how a system without transfer would work, a brief exegesis on
transfer's cost is useful.
III. THE TRAVESTY OF TRANSFER
Research carried out over the past two decades provides good evidence
that transferring juvenile offenders to adult court is not easily justifiable on
utilitarian grounds. Transfer is not an effective method of promoting either
general or specific deterrence.12 5 It is also not a good way to ensure juvenile
offenders receive treatment.12 6 Transfer obviously does permit prolonged
incapacitation, but because that incapacitation is not based on individualized
risk assessments and tends to detain offenders beyond the point at which they
would naturally desist, it over-incarcerates as a preventive mechanism.12 7 That
leaves satisfying society's retributive instincts as the primary justification for
transfer. Some preliminary research suggests that, as a utilitarian matter,
transfer fails on this score as well.128 Only the belief that juvenile dispositions
do not give serious juvenile offenders what they deserve, combined with a
desire to make sure they receive that punishment regardless of cost, can support
the continued existence of transfer.
A. General Deterrence
Research that looks at the general deterrent effect of transfer, as compared
to the deterrent effect of keeping an offender in juvenile court, is fairly
consistent. Only one major study has found a significant deterrent effect
associated with transfer. Steven Levitt's examination of national juvenile crime
statistics between 1978 and 1993 concluded that crime among youth reaching
the age of criminal responsibility (eighteen) significantly decreased in those
states in which an appreciable difference existed between juvenile and adult
sentences, but not in those states that tended to sentence juveniles in a similar
fashion whether they ended up in juvenile or adult court.129 However, Levitt's
study appears to have conflated the effects of deterrence and incapacitation;
those states with stiffer penalties in adult court detained youth longer, and thus
reduced the potential for re-offending.13 0 Virtually every other study on general
124. Id.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 127-38.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 139-49.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 152-67.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 171-76.
129. Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156, 1162-68 (1998).
130. See David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and
Evidence, BERKELEY PROGRAM IN LAW & ECON., U.C. BERKELEY 7 (July 31, 2009), available at
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deterrence has found that transfer did not lowerjuvenile crime rates, decreased
them only marginally, or actually increased them.'3 1  Richard Redding has
concluded that "[t]he bulk of the evidence suggests that transfer laws, at least as
currently implemented and publicized, have little or no general deterrent effect
in preventing serious juvenile crime.',132
One could nonetheless justifiably wonder whether deterrent power would
be lost vis-A-Vis imprisonment in the adult system if, as we suggest, the juvenile
system became more oriented toward community-based treatment like MST.
Several considerations should allay such concerns. As noted earlier, in the
prevention-oriented system we propose, detention would be an option for those
convicted of serious crimes, and repeat offenders would be more likely to be
detained because of their elevated risk.'33  Those aspects of the regime,
combined with the relative undeterrability of youth, their obliviousness to any
sanctions that await them,' 3 4 and the fact that even today many transferred
youth are not detained for extremely long periods,13 5 suggest that the little
general deterrent effect transfer brings would not be significantly diminished if
it were eliminated.
http://emlab.berkley.edu/-jmccrary/lee-and mccrary2009.pdf (noting that "the use of annual data [as in
Levitt's paper] has the potential to conflate deterrence and incapacitation effects").
131. See Richard E. Redding, Juvenile TransferLaws: An EffectiveDeterrenttoDelinquency?, JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN 1, 2-3 (June 2010), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf
(canvassing five studies, all of which showed little or no deterrent effect of transfer, and the Levitt study); see
also Jacob Cohn & Hugo M. Mialon, The Impact ofJuvenile Transfer Laws on Juvenile Crime I (Mar. 6,
2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1606002 ("We find that each ofthe tougherjuvenile transfer laws
is positively correlated with juvenile crime in at least one category, while the weaker juvenile transfer law (the
reverse waiver) is negatively correlated with juvenile crime in several categories."); Lee & McCrary, supra
note 130, at 33-34 (finding "small deterrence effects" associated with transfer, consistent with "impatient or
even myopic behavior"); Justin McCrary & Sarath Sanga, Youth Offenders and the Deterrence Effect of
Prison 12 (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1980326 (stating that "the results from each
data set either point toward little to no deterrence, or yield estimates that are too noisy to draw meaningful
inference").
132. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: Ineffective Deterrent to Delinquency, supra note 13 1, at 3. These
findings are also consistent with research on deterrence in the adult criminal justice context, which suggests
that increasing sentences has little effect on crime. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions ofSentencing, 34
CRIME & JUST. 1, 28 (2006) (summarizing the results of three National Academy of Sciences panel
investigations by stating "[i]maginable increases in severity of punishments do not yield significant (if any)
marginal deterrent effects").
133. Cf JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71 (1980) ("Ifthere is one
finding that overshadows all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future crime increases
with each prior criminal act.").
134. For instance, most studies find that juveniles either are unaware of or do not care about the
heightened sanctions that accompany transfer. See Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: Ineffective Deterrent to
Delinquency, supra note 131, at 3 (summarizing four studies reporting results of interviews ofjuveniles about
their knowledge of transfer laws).
135. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 106-16 (2006). Ninety-five percent ofjuveniles who are transferred to
adult court are released before their twenty-fifth birthday. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: Ineffective
Deterrent to Delinquency, supra note 131, at 1-2.
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B. Specific Deterrence
Transfer does even worse as a specific deterrence mechanism. Transfer to
adult court is generally associated with higher re-arrest rates than the re-arrest
rates of those offenders who stay in juvenile court. Summarizing six studies
that controlled numerous variables such as offense severity, prior offenses, and
age, Redding's review concludes that "[a]ll of the studies found higher
recidivism rates among offenders who had been transferred to criminal court,
compared with those who were retained in the juvenile system."'3 6 He bluntly
concludes "transfer substantially increases recidivism." 3 7 A more recent study
comparing transferred and non-transferred youth in Arizona, matched on more
variables than previous studies, found that, while transferred youth who
committed property crimes were more likely to recidivate upon release, those
who committed violent crimes were less likely to reoffend.13 8 The latter finding
is diminished, however, by the fact that the follow-up period for the study was
four years, during most of which the youth who were transferred and convicted
for crimes against the person were, presumably, in prison. 3 9
The fact that transfer is not an effective means of generating specific
deterrence is not surprising. Research confirms the intuition that the
stigmatizing effect of the "felon" label, the sense of injustice that an adolescent
feels at being tried as an adult, the "education" about crime provided by adult
prisoners, and the brutalizing effect of prison life can all contribute to a
continued life of crime.' 40 Perhaps an even more important explanation for the
specific deterrence effects that researchers have found, however, lies in the fact
that treatment options in the juvenile systems are almost always superior to
those found in the adult criminal system.141
136. See Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: Ineffective Deterrent to Delinquency, supra note 13 1, at 6.
137. Id Two of these six studies did find that transfer reduced recidivism among drug offenders, and a
third study found lower recidivism rates among transferred property offenders. See id But other studies in
the same jurisdictions contradicted those results. See id; see also Angela McGowan et al., Effects on Violence
of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult
Justice System, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S7 (2007) (discussing whether transfer aids in reducing violence
among incarcerated and released juveniles).
138. EDWARD P. MULVEY & CAROL A. SCHUBERT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN-TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO ADULT
COURT: EFFECTS OF A BROAD POLICY IN ONE COURT 13 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.ojjdp.
gov/pubs/232932.pdf.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: Ineffective Deterrent to Delinquency, supra note 131, at 7-8
(summarizing research findings on these four points).
141. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN-JUVENILE JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 2 (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/178995.pdf
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C Rehabilitation
Given the traditional rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court, it stands to
reason that the juvenile court system will have more to offer than the adult
system in terms of treatment.142 In fact, both objective observers and youths
themselves believe that adult facilities are less treatment-oriented and more
security-focused than juvenile facilities.143 Even those adult systems that make
an effort at providing rehabilitative services are not likely to provide the
relatively short-term, community-based programs that are often the most
effective means of reducing recidivism in juvenile offenders.1" Yet under
automatic transfer laws, even first-time offenders who have never had the
benefit of the juvenile system's superior resources can be sent to adult
prisons.14 5
A more subtle disadvantage of transfer in connection with the
rehabilitative goal is that it undermines efforts to pressure courts and
legislatures into making treatment options in the juvenile system even better.
As it stands today, in many cases the transfer decision depends in large part on
economics, or as the transfer provisions at issue in Kent v. United States put it,
"the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile . .. by the use of
procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court." 46
A majority of state transfer statutes explicitly provide, consistent with this
provision, that one factor to consider in determining whether transfer should
occur is whether treatment programs are available within the jurisdiction.147
Yet in many states, the programs are simply not there.
Unfortunately, therefore, Kent's language is often dispositive in transfer
decision-making. Numerous decisions make clear that courts have transferred a
juvenile to adult court solely because of a lack of accessible programs.148 For
instance, one court waived juvenile court jurisdiction for a fourteen-year-old
because the State's experts testified that the state lacked adequate facilities to
deal with a fourteen-year-old homicide offender.14 9 Another court transferred a
142. See id.
143. See Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFERS OF ADOLESCENTS TO ADULT COURT, supra note 16, at 227, 254-57, 259-60
(reporting their own research and studies conducted by others that compare juvenile correctional facilities that
are treatment-oriented favorably to custody-oriented adult facilities on both objective and subjective grounds).
144. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 72-74, programs like Multi-Systemic Therapy
usually last around four months, which is not likely to be considered sufficient for people convicted of felonies
and sentenced to an adult disposition, even if it is tacked on to an initial short period of detention.
145. Brandi Grissom, Report: Hundreds of Youths in Adult Prisons, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.texastribune.org/2ll/O3/24//report-hundreds-of-youths-in-adult-prisons/.
146. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966) (appendix to the decision).
147. Kirk Heilbrun et al., A National Survey of U.S. Statutes on Juvenile Transfer: Implications for
Policy and Practice, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 125, 128-43 (1997) (listing over twenty-five states that use Kent's
language on this issue); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-1.5 (West 1997) (providing that transfer may occur
if the court determines that the juvenile "is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system").
148. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 836 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
149. Id.
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youth who became violent when he consumed alcohol because the jurisdiction
offered no substance abuse program.so In perhaps the most egregious case
(thankfully, now mooted by the Supreme Court's decision in Roper), the court
rejected the argument that "the state has an obligation not to execute ajuvenile
who is deemed to be amenable to treatment but for whom the state offers no
appropriate treatment program."' 5' Courts also routinely refuse to consider a
juvenile offender treatable when the only pertinent programs are in another
jurisdiction. 152
These types of decisions led us to conclude in Juveniles at Risk that "[i]f
transfer were eliminated, courts would have to confront the problems caused by
the current paucity of treatment programs and might become more willing to
force legislatures to [treat] them."'s3 This impetus is necessary. According to
one estimate, only 15,000 juvenile offenders per year participate in MST and
similar regimes; despite the success of these programs, states have been
unwilling to scale them up.154 From a crime-prevention perspective, that failure
is shortsighted.
D. Incapacitation
Long sentences imposed by adult courts clearly have a more significant
incapacitative impact than shorter juvenile sentences. But a proper utilitarian
analysis of incapacitative effects must take into account the extent to which
incarceration in adult prison is necessary to protect the public. There are
several reasons to believe that, on this score, the cost of transfer is greater than
the benefit.
First, under the transfer laws of most states, the majority ofjuveniles who
are transferred are not assessed for risk.'55 Transfer is often automatically or
implicitly triggered by the nature of the offense, which may or may not bear a
relationship to dangerousness; particularly when transfer occurs after a first
offense, justifying transfer on incapacitation grounds will rarely make sense,
even when the offense is a serious one. 56
150. In re R.M., 648 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); see also Commonwealth
v. Cessna, 537 A.2d 834, 839 (Pa. 1988) (determining that the juvenile did not show that there was ajuvenile
facility that would accept him).
151. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987).
152. See, e.g., P.K.M. v. State, 780 P.2d 395, 399 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (finding no obligation to look
beyond state borders); Dillard v. State, 623 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Idaho 1981) (holding transfer permissible
because contract with California to provide juvenile treatment had expired and there were no placement
contracts with other states).
153. SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 80.
154. Scott W. Henggeler & Sonja K. Schoenwald, Evidence-BasedInterventions for Juvenile Offenders
and Juvenile Justice Policies that Support Them, 25 Soc. POL'Y REP. 1, 8 (2011), available at
http://www.jmcgvlkpd.mtfc.com/20ll EBinterventions_forjuvoffenders.pdf.
155. See, e.g., ARIZ. JUV. CT. R. P. 34 (2013).
156. Cf Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorensen, Assertions of "Future
Dangerousness" at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates ofSubsequent Prison Misconduct and
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If, instead, transfer is based on an individualized assessment of
amenability to treatment-which is supposed to happen in most states with
respect to at least some types ofjuvenile offenders-some assessment of risk is
more likely. 57 But even in this situation, the transfer decision is often focused
on factors other than the precise issue of dangerousness, including age, the
seriousness of the offense, the success of past treatment attempts, the maturity
of the juvenile, and the availability of treatment programs in juvenile court.5
As a result, many juveniles who are transferred are probably at low risk for
committing a serious crime.159 A system that incarcerates such people in adult
prisons is not an optimal incapacitative mechanism.
Second, most people who offend during their adolescent years naturally
stop offending sometime in their twenties, even when they are not
incarcerated.160  Young adults find jobs, get married, and, in general, acquire
"stakes in life" that militate against a life of crime. 16 1 Neurobiological and
developmental research confirms that a person's impulsivity and susceptibility
to peer influence significantly diminishes in the early to mid-twenties.162 Thus,
if the goal is public safety, prolonged incarceration of people who commit
crimes as adolescents is excessive.163
Prolonged incarceration is also counterproductive. As the research on
deterrence implies, prison is criminogenic.'6 Transfer may keep a troublesome
youth off the streets, but it increases the probability that youth will turn to crime
Violence, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 61 (2008) (finding that less than one percent of inmates sentenced to
life in federal prison for homicide perpetrated an assault causing even moderate injuries, none of the prisoners
caused a life-threatening injury or assaulted a member of the prison staff, and none committed another
homicide while incarcerated).
157. See Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Amenability
to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 317-27 (1999) (describing the factors courts have
relied upon in making transfer decisions and analyzing their relationship to the amenability to treatment and
dangerousness issue).
158. See id.
159. Cf DAVID BRANDT, DELINQUENCY, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOcIAL PoLicY 77-78 (2006) (stating that
79% of transfers in Florida involved property offenses); Jeffrey J. Shook, Contesting Childhood in the US
Justice System: The Transfer ofJuveniles to Adult Criminal Court, 12 CHILDHOOD 461, 466 (2005) (stating
that 40% of those transferred committed property crimes); Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age
at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-
State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 794 (2000) (stating that 46% to 55% of transferred cases
involved property offenses).
160. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REv. 674, 675 (1993) (reporting research finding that "[t]he
majority of criminal offenders are teenagers; by the early 20s, the number of active offenders decreases by
over 50%, and by age 28, almost 85% of former delinquents desist from offending").
161. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note I1, at 26-27 (describing research showing that "escape
from risk-inducing environments is more difficult for dependent children than for adults," that "adolescents
have less freedom to engage in 'socially acceptable' outlets for risk behavior," and that the reduced stakes in
life of adolescents "may lead them to feel they have less to lose than adults").
162. See id. at 20-26 (summarizing the developmental and neurobiological literature on the differences
between juveniles and adults).
163. Id.
164. See Lee & McCrary, supra note 130, at 7.
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once back on the streets.165  Also important is the fact that adolescents in adult
prisons are highly likely to be the victims of crime themselves, a fact which
must be weighed on the cost side of the ledger.'66 In short, the safety of both
the public and of juvenile offenders would be enhanced by moving from
detention-heavy policies to those that focus on community-based corrections.167
Finally, as I will emphasize below, if incapacitation is necessary, the
juvenile system is capable of carrying it out.168  The persistently violent
offender probably needs to be detained behind bars, but those bars do not need
to be provided by the adult system. 69  Juvenile detention facilities are also
criminogenic, but not nearly as much as adult prisons.170
E. Retribution
The foregoing discussion suggests that retribution is the strongest, and
perhaps the only, justification for transfer. The argument in this vein is that
certain crimes demand prolonged punishment, which only the adult system can
provide. If retribution is defined solely from a deontological perspective and
desert is based solely on the offense (rather than the whole person), this
argument is persuasive. For reasons already suggested, a sixteen-year-old who
commits murder, attempted murder, aggravated rape, armed robbery, a major
drug distribution offense, or any other offense that would warrant a sentence of
ten years or longer if committed by an adult, will generally have to be
transferred to adult court if a retributively appropriate sentence is to be
imposed, even assuming a robust discount for youth and juvenile dispositional
jurisdiction ending at twenty-one, rather than eighteen.' 7'
165. See McCrary & Sanga, supra note 131, at 9-12.
166. See MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 138, at 4-5 (summarizing research on victimization,
including one study that found that juveniles in adult prisons are five times more likely to be sexually
assaulted and almost twice as likely to be attacked with a weapon or beaten by staff than juveniles housed in
juvenile facilities).
167. One empirically-based analysis comes to the conclusion that even detention injuvenile facilities is
"dangerous," "ineffective," "unnecessary," "obsolete," "wasteful," and "inadequate," and recommends that
correctional placements for juvenile offenders should be significantly reduced. Richard A. Mendel, No Place
for Kids: The Case for Redacting Juvenile Incarceration, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. 2-4 (2011), available at
http://www.aecf.orgf-/media/PubsfTopics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlace
ForKids/JJNoPlaceForKidsFull.pdf. The report also analyzes data from states that have reduced detention of
juveniles within their juvenile justice systems in recent years and concludes that "[s]ubstantially reducing
juvenile incarceration rates has not proven to be a catalyst for more youth crime." Id at 27.
168. See infra Part ME.
169. See infra Part M.E.
170. Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of
Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 28 (2002) ("There is a consistent
pattern of higher offending among adolescents punished as adults compared to adolescents punished as
juveniles."); see generally Randi Hjalnarsson, Juvenile Jails: A Path to the Straight and Narrow or to
Hardened Criminality?, 52 J. L. & ECON. 779 (2009) (describing a study that detention in juvenile facilities is
more effective at "deterring" juvenile crime than transfer to adult prison).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
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Retribution does not have to be defined in deontological terms,
however.17 2  A consequentialist approach to desert analysis might look to the
effects of failing to adhere to the "morally correct" punishment from a desert
perspective.17 3 What will be the real-world impact of a system that does not
give juvenile offenders their retributive due?
One hypothesis is that people upset with punishment that is perceived to
be lenient will be more prone to take matters into their own hands or in some
other way express disdain for the legal system. For instance, Paul Robinson,
who has developed the concept of "empirical desert," has argued that if
punishment routinely fails to track empirically-derived lay views on deserved
punishment, the result might be more noncompliance with the law in general,
because people will lose respect for a government that is substantively unjust.17 4
He and his colleagues have conducted research that purports to support that
position.175 My own research, however, indicates that even when punishment
represents a truly radical departure from lay norms, the hypothesized
generalized non-compliance effects do not occur or occur only trivially.176
Furthermore, to the extent such noncompliance effects do occur, they are at
least as likely when punishment departs from utilitarian precepts as from
retributive ones.1
More importantly, no research along these lines has been carried out in
connection with juvenile justice.' 7 8  Even if punishments that diverge from
desert do have general non-compliance effects when they are imposed on
adults, the same divergence in the juvenile context might not have the same
impact. A survey conducted by Scott and Steinberg found, for instance, that
"[a]dult punishment and long incarceration are approved, for the most part,
only as a means to protect the public from violent young criminals; however, if
other more lenient sanctions are effective, they are favored over
incarceration."1 7 9  This finding suggests not only that retribution is not as
important in the juvenile context as in the adult context, but also that the public
supports transfer largely as a means of protecting its members. Accordingly, if
172. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED
How MUCH? 144 (2008).
173. See id.
174. See id. ("[A] distribution of liability that deviates from community perceptions of just desert
undermines the system's moral credibility and therefore its crime control effectiveness.").
175. See Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility ofInjustice, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1999-2007 (2010) (reporting studies that purport to find a diminishment in both
willingness to comply with the law and willingness to cooperate with authorities in those who are exposed to
"unjust" punishment scenarios).
176. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV.
77, 101-08 (2013) (reporting studies that suggest "the relationship between compliance and satisfaction with
the substance of the criminal law is complicated and difficult to predict, and that any relationship that does
exist is not likely to be very strong").
177. Id. at 102-03 (reporting a study suggesting that "while failing to adhere to desert might cause some
noncompliance, failing to adhere to utilitarian goals could cause even more noncompliance").
178. See id.
179. SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 281.
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a juvenile justice system can protect society as effectively as the adult system,
transfer is not needed from the empirical desert point of view.
IV. CONCLUSION: A JUVENILE SYSTEM WITHOUT TRANSFER
A juvenile justice system without transfer could be structured in several
ways. In Juveniles at Risk, we proposed that act jurisdiction end at age
eighteen, while dispositional jurisdiction would extend to twenty-five.s 0 Both
of these age thresholds are somewhat arbitrary.'8  But both are based on past
practices in a number of states. 8 2 More importantly, both coincide with
empirical research that indicates that (1) after age seventeen, non-mentally
disordered people tend to possess the capacities demanded by any account of
criminal culpability; 83 and (2) through age twenty-four, the brain is still
maturing and character is still forming so that interventions are most likely to
have significant effect up to that point.1
Under this regime, a seventeen-year-old who commits a crime could be
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction for up to eight years, while offenders who
are younger at the time of their crimes might be under that jurisdiction for a
longer period of time.'85 However, most juveniles-even those who commit
serious crimes-would not be subject to detention for anywhere near the full
length of juvenile court jurisdiction, because most treatment regimes can be
completed more quickly,'86 because desistance will often occur well before
twenty-five,187 and because program personnel would know that even detention
in juvenile facilities is criminogenic and thus should be as short-lived as
possible. 88
Given this outcome, a deontological retributivist would probably be
unhappy with most dispositions of serious offenders in the proposed regime.
Whether the same conclusion would be reached by a consequentialist
retributivist--one who weighs the delegitimizing impact of failing to punish an
180. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 79-80.
181. See id
182. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK (2006), available at http://ojdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/
structure process/qa04106.asp?qaDate=2004. Most states end juvenile courtjurisdiction at age twenty-one;
about eight extend it beyond that age. Id.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
184. See Diana Fishbein et al., Deficits in Behavioral Inhibition Predict Treatment Engagement in Prison
Inmates, 33 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 419, 429 (2009) (explaining that the development of the prefrontal cortex,
which is the part of the brain most closely associated with control and executive functioning, "remain[s]
underdeveloped relative to other brain regions until about age 25"); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents
Less Mature than Adults? Minors'Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA
"Flip-Flop ", 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2007) (comparing psychosocial development of adolescents
and adults in their mid-twenties).
185. See SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 11, at 79-80.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
187. See supra note 160.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39.
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offender as harshly as "society" wants against the benefits of avoiding
transfer-is not clear. Legitimacy costs will be highest when an adolescent
commits a horrific crime and the prosecutor has to concede that, even if
convicted and sentenced to the extent the law will allow, at most, the offender
will spend eight to ten years in detention.
A well-known example of this phenomenon is the case of Willie Bosket.
During an eight-day period in 1978, when he was fifteen years old, Bosket
committed or tried to commit five armed robberies in or around the New York
City subway system, in the course of which two individuals were killed and a
third wounded. 18 9 Sentenced to only five years in juvenile court, his case
created such an outcry in New York that Governor Carey, who had previously
been opposed to increasing transfer jurisdiction, called a special session of the
legislature to consider juvenile justice reform.190 The result was a law that
lowered adult jurisdiction to fifteen and permitted prosecution of youths as
young as thirteen if charged with murder.'91 Proving to some observers the
wisdom of this legislative change, within four months of his release from
juvenile court jurisdiction in 1983, Bosket assaulted and robbed a man.1 92
While serving the resulting sentence during the next ten years, he committed a
number of other assaults against court officials and prison guards and also
committed arson.19 3 Today, serving a prison term of twenty-five years to life,
Bosket is housed in a special plexiglass-lined cell with four video cameras
trained on him at all times.' 94 Visitors may only talk to him through a window
in the cell.195
In light of the New York legislature's immediate response to Bosket, one
might conclude that the proposed regime would not survive its first Bosket-type
case. Ideally, however, politicians would resist the idea that thirteen-to-
seventeen-year-old murderers should be sentenced to life terms simply because
a vocal portion of the citizenry demands it. They could try to allay the fears of
those worried about public safety by citing the research that identifies more
effective, less costly crime-prevention measures. And they might be able to
combat retribution-driven concerns by asking the public to focus on the
offender's full life story. In Bosket's case, for instance, had public authorities
disclosed not only Bosket's offenses, but also emphasized that he had begun
offending at age nine, soon after his father was put in prison for life on a
189. See Fox BUTrERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN
TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 213-15 (1995) (giving a full account of the Bosket case and his crimes).
190. Id at 226-27.
191. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(18) (McKinney 2009).
192. See Fox Butterfield, Jailed "Monster" Gets More Prison Time for Stabbing a Guard, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 1989), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/20/nyregion/jailed-monster-gets-more-prison-
time-for-stabbing-a-guard.html.
193. Id




TREA TING JUVENILES AS JUVENILES
murder conviction, that his mother had nothing to do with him from an early
age, and that he was in and out of reformatories that did little but warehouse
him, the public's vengeful urges might have been assuaged.' 96
If that seems pollyannish and a more robust legislative response is thought
to be needed, a juvenile justice system without transfer could include a
dispositional safety valve, which would permit preventive confinement to
continue past age twenty-five for those offenders who (like Bosket?) are
"dangerous beyond their control."' 9 7 The latter language comes from Kansas v.
Hendricks and was the Court's way of describing a narrow subset of adult
offenders who may be detained beyond their sentence on risk grounds without
violating substantive due process.198 Only a few offenders would qualify for
such detention, however. 99 As the Court put it in a later case, to permit this
type of preventive detention "there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior. . . . sufficient to distinguish the dangerous ... offender
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary
criminal case." 2 00
While this safety valve might seem to be transfer in disguise, it is different
from transfer in two essential ways. First, the decision to confine for a longer
period of time does not occur at the front end, before it can be known whether
treatment and the aging process will minimize the person's risk, but only after
the offender has demonstrated he is dangerous beyond control.20' Second, the
disposition remains indeterminate, which means that release before the
"deserved" length of punishment is always a possibility.202 As the Supreme
Court stated in Graham, "[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom" to juveniles, but it must provide "some meaningful opportunity for
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. 20 3
The proposal, then, is to create a juvenile justice system that permits
exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction until age twenty-five and authorizes
preventive detention beyond that age for those who are dangerous beyond their
control. Yet to be answered is whether such a system would satisfy modem
retributive urges sufficiently to inhibit populist actions-either against
particular juvenile offenders or against the State-that stem from a perceived
failure to exact sufficient punishment. But given the known disadvantages of
transfer, experimentation with such a system is preferable to continuing to try
196. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 189, at 135-49, 176-78 (describing Bosket's early years and from
ages eight to eleven).
197. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
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203. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010).
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juvenile offenders as adults simply to placate a deontological demand for
justice.
